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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Worldwide, the number of women on corporate boards is
disproportionately low when compared to their representation in the
workplace.3 In countries without legislation enforcing quotas, the rate of
increase in women’s board representation has been quite slow.4 With
conflicting evidence as to whether female representation on boards improves

1
Cinderella is a fairy tale with many versions dating from at least the eighteenth century. All
versions reviewed had the following elements: (1) Cinderella, a virtuous and long-suffering young
woman, was mistreated by her stepmother and stepsisters; (2) a fairy godmother provided her with
appropriate attire and transportation to attend the king’s ball and subsequent events, with warnings that
all of the clothing, attendants, and transport would be returned to commonplace items and creatures at
midnight; (3) Cinderella left hastily without revealing her whereabouts or name to observe this enforced
curfew and consequently, the prince who fell in love with her searched the kingdom with the one glass
slipper she left behind to establish her identity by shoe size; (4) after penetrating various subterfuges, the
prince found Cinderella; and (5) Cinderella and the prince lived happily ever after. The title reference
alludes to elements (1), (4), and (5). Michael N. Salda, The Cinderella Project, U. OF S. MISS., Version
1.2 (Oct. 2005), http://www.usm.edu/english/fairytales/cinderella/cinderella.html.
2
From 1993–2011, Ms. Woryk was employed as in-house counsel and then Human Resources
Vice President to a London-based company. Her duties included advising the board of directors with
regard to corporate social responsibility strategy, initiatives, and performance. The opinions given here
are her opinions.
3
Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance
and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291–92 (2009).
4
See Susan Vinnicombe OBE et al., The Female FTSE Board Report 2010: Opening up the
Appointment Process, CRANFIELD UNIV. SCH. OF MGMT., 3 (2010), http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/
dinamic-content/research/documents/FemaleFTSEReport2010.pdf; Women in the boardroom: A global
perspective, DELOITTE (Jan. 2011), http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.content
management.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/NwNor/Page%20Copy/Home/Women%20in%20the%20Bo
ardroom%20-%20November%202011.pdf; Marleen A. O’Connor, Symposium, Women and the “New”
Corporate Governance, Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The Behavioral Dynamics
of Gender, Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 469–70 (2006).
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profitability,5 corporations are unlikely to work actively to enlarge female
board membership. Ratings agencies, institutional investors, and companies
have not widely adopted gender-balanced boards as a Corporate Social
Responsibility (“CSR”) priority.6 Nevertheless, long-term technological,
cultural, economic, and demographic trends may accelerate representation.7
II. CURRENT STATUS AND CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE
Women hold half of the managerial positions in large corporations
in the United States,8 yet occupied only 14.8% of Fortune 500 board seats as
of 2007.9 When one reviews the broader group of public companies rated
by GovernanceMetrics International, the U.S. percentage as of 2011 was
12.3%.10 The aggregate percentage of women on boards in industrialized
countries is set forth below:11
Australasia
Australia

10.9%

New Zealand

12.0%

Asia
Hong Kong

9.4%

Singapore

7.3%

Japan

0.9%

5
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 3, at 292 (“[F]irms perform worse the greater is the gender
diversity of the board.”); Rohini Pande & Deanna Ford, Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A
Review, 1 (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished Background Paper for the World Development Report on
Gender), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rpande/papers/Gender%20Quotas%20-%20
April%202011.pdf (“While female entry on boards is correlated with changing management practices,
this change appears to adversely influence short-run profits.”). But see Judy B. Rosener, The Business
Case for Having More Women on Boards, WOMEN ON BOARD MENTORING PROGRAM, 2 (May 2003),
available at http://www.womenonboard.ca/docs/The-Business-Case.pdf (“Fortune 500 companies with
the highest percentage of female directors outperformed competitors with the lowest female
representation.”); O’Connor, supra note 4, at 476 (“[T]he business case is unlikely to bring about
changes because it is empirically fragile.”); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 8 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance,
Working Paper Series No. 89, 2010) (“In sum, the empirical research on the effect of board diversity on
firm performance is inconclusive, and the results are highly dependent on methodology.”); but see also
Women Matter: Gender Diversity, a Corporate Performance Driver, MCKINSEY & CO., 1 (2007),
http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/swiss/news_publications/pdf/women_matter_english.pdf
(“The
study suggests that the companies where women are most strongly represented at board or topmanagement level are also the companies that perform best.”) [hereinafter Women Matter].
6
Review of 2010 questionnaires by Institutional Voting Information Service, RREV Proxy
Advisory Services, and Experts in Responsible Investment Services show much interest in board
composition, but no specific questions regarding member gender as a measure of corporate responsibility
(on file with author). Email from Julie McDowell, Head of Sustainable and Responsible Inv., Standard
Life Invs. Ltd., to author (May 16, 2011, 3:39 PM) (on file with author).
7
See KAY S. HYMOWITZ, MANNING UP: HOW THE RISE OF WOMEN HAS TURNED MEN INTO BOYS
passim (2011); Women in America: Indicators of Social and Economic Well-Being, THE WHITE HOUSE,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cwg/data-on-women (last visited Jan. 20,
2012) [hereinafter Women in America].
8
O’Connor, supra note 4, at 466.
9
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 3, at 291.
10
2011 Women on Boards Report, GOVERNANCEMETRICS INT’L, 10 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www2.
gmiratings.com/product_documents/377women_on_boards_2011.pdf.
11
Id.
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Europe
Austria

7.5%

Italy

Belgium

7.7%

Netherlands

3.7%
14.0%

France

12.7%

Portugal

2.3%

Germany

11.2%

Spain

9.3%
8.7%

Greece

8.8%

Switzerland

Ireland

9.5%

United Kingdom 9.1%

Scandinavia
Denmark

13.9%

Norway

35.6%

Finland

24.5%

Sweden

27.3%

12.9%

United States

12.3%

U.S./Canada
Canada

For non-Scandinavian companies in industrialized economies, the
range is 0.9% (Japan) to 14% (Netherlands).12 In the Scandinavian
countries, where (as will be discussed below) legislation dictates gender
composition of boards, the range is from 13.9% (Denmark) to 35.6%
(Norway).13 For FTSE14 companies in the United Kingdom, the number of
female directorships has risen only 5% (to 12%) in ten years and the
Equality and Human Rights Commission estimated that if the trend
continues, equally balanced boards are seventy-five years away.15 In the
United States, in 2001, women held 11.6% of board seats in Fortune 500
companies;16 the increase to 15.7% female board members by 201017 shows
12
13
14

Id.
Id.

The FTSE Group (pronounced “footsie”) computes tens of thousands of indices of
market performance daily. The most famous stock index of the FTSE Group is the
FTSE 100, first calculated in 1984, which consists of the 100 largest companies by
market capitalization on the London Stock Exchange. The composition of the
FTSE 100 is reviewed quarterly. The FTSE Group formed as an independent
company in 1995 from what was originally a joint venture of the Financial Times
and the London Stock Exchange. Formerly a UK-centric organization, the FTSE
Group’s indices now cover markets worldwide . . . .
FTSE, INVESTOR GLOSSARY, http://www.investorglossary.com/ftse.htm (last visited July 25, 2011).
15
Sarah Arnott, Revealed: The Gender Gap in British Business, THE INDEP., (Aug. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/revealed-the-gender-gap-in-britishbusiness-2052374.html.
16
Douglas M. Branson, No Seat at the Table: How Corporate Governance and Law Keep Women
Out of the Boardroom 89 (Univ. Pittsburgh Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 2007-11, Nov. 2007).
17
Lissa L. Broome, Wachovia Professor of Banking Law and Director of the Center for Banking
and Finance, UNC Sch. of Law, Corporate Board Diversity Speech at the University of Dayton School of
Law Symposium, Perspectives on Gender & Business Ethics: Women in Corporate Governance (Feb. 25,
2011).
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progress, but a long way to go before equality. McKinsey & Company’s
database of six European nations, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (“BRIC
countries”) as of 2010, showed continuing underrepresentation “despite
some improvements in a few countries.”18
A 2011 survey of twenty-two countries in emerging economies
throughout the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa reflects
an aggregate percentage range from 0% (Morocco and Peru) to 16.4%
(South Africa):19
Americas
Brazil

5.1%

Mexico

6.8%

Chile

1.9%

Peru

0.0%

Colombia

8.5%

China

8.5%

Philippines

11.6%

India

4.8%

South Korea

1.9%

Indonesia

4.5%

Taiwan

6.1%

Malaysia

6.3%

Thailand

8.7%

Czech Rep.

8.3%

Poland

10.8%

Hungary

6.1%

Russia

5.9%

Egypt

6.7%

South Africa

16.4%

Israel

13.4%

Turkey

10.8%

Asia

Europe

Middle East & Africa

Morocco

0%

During the last decade worldwide, only Scandinavia shows marked
change.20 Certainly, the disparity between the percentage of women in the
workforce and those in board seats is significant. While a study of Fortune
500 companies from 1997 through 2001 showed increasing female
representation on boards, women will not achieve 50% of board seats in
Fortune 500 companies until 2081 if the 2001 rate continues.21
18

Women at the top of corporations: Making it happen, MCKINSEY & CO., 2 (2010),
www.mckinsey.com/locations/swiss/newspublications/pdf/women_matter_2010_4.pdf.
19
2011 Women on Boards Report, supra note 10, at 13.
20
Rhode & Packel, supra note 5, at 1.
21
Richard A. Bernardi et al., Does Female Representation on Boards of Directors Associate With
Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” List?, 45 BUS. & SOC’Y 235, 243–44 (2006).
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A. Profit Analysis
Proving that boards with women directors result in better financial
performance would presumably clear the path for women. Despite many
researchers’ attempts to make the business case for female representation on
boards, results are inconclusive.22
A recent economic study concluded that “gender diversity has
beneficial effects in companies with weak shareholder rights, where
additional board monitoring could enhance firm value, but detrimental
effects in companies with strong shareholder rights.”23 While it went on to
conclude that attendance at board meetings improves for all members when
women are represented,24 no direct economic benefit was found for all
firms. In other studies, women managers scored above men in giving
feedback, integrity, motivation, and productivity.25 While all of these
factors are desirable for a quality board, direct proof of improved
profitability would be more compelling.
A 53% higher return on equity has been cited for the Fortune 500
companies with the highest percentage of female directors in at least one
2007 study,26 but other studies reviewing data from a number of countries
have come to differing conclusions.27 A 2010 study found that the
companies in European and BRIC countries with the highest share of
women on executive boards outperformed companies with no women in
these leadership positions, concluding that “[w]hile this link does not
demonstrate causality, it does provide a strong factual basis to continue to
argue in favor of greater gender diversity in corporate top management.”28
Nevertheless, the low percentage of female representation indicates the
research showing such a link has not motivated directors to more proactively
seek women for boards.
Interestingly, a theory has been advanced that female directors have
no effect on profits but negative effects on stock value because of the gender
bias of institutional investors.29 The neutral effect on profits leads the
authors to suggest that “boards don’t much matter”30 in terms of impact on a
company’s profitability. A more hopeful conclusion is that, as boards
increase female representation, this bias will be supplanted by a more
22

Rhode & Packel, supra note 5, at 8.
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 3, at 292.
24
Id. at 297–98.
25
O’Connor, supra note 4, at 473–74.
26
Rosener, supra note 5, at 2.
27
See Rhode & Packel, supra note 5, at 8.
28
Women at the top of corporations, supra note 18, at 7.
29
Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling the Gaps:
Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional
Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 828 (2011).
30
Id.
23
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positive perception of women so that stock values do not suffer.
B. Legislation
A law review article by Darren Rosenblum provides a fascinating
study of the Norway experience, where, as in other Scandinavian countries,
gender diversity is mandated. 31 In 2003, the Norwegian legislature passed a
law requiring boards of public companies to have at least 33% to 50% of
each gender, with exact percentages varying by board size, but a 40% ratio
for boards over ten members.32 Potentially adverse consequences arose
when women directors took up multiple directorships and some companies
actually delisted as public companies to avoid meeting the requirement.33
Further, the European Free Trade Association began an investigation as to
whether the Norwegian quota law violated European Union (“EU”) law due
to reverse discrimination potential.34
This investigation is not consistent with recent statements by the EU
parliament, which announced on July 6, 2011, that EU businesses must hire
women on their executive boards by next year or face the prospect of
legislation being introduced in 2012 to require phasing-in a mandatory quota
of 40%.35 The announced goal was for women to make up 30% of top
management in the largest listed companies by 2015, and 40% by 2020.36
Whether the EU will enact such legislation remains to be seen, given the EU
member countries’ varying positions on this initiative.
In 2011, Italy approved a new law establishing that, as of 2015, 30%
of board members of public companies should be women.37 The French
adopted a 2010 quota law requiring that public companies have at least 20%
women directors within three years of enactment and 40% by 2017.38 In
2007, Spain passed a law requiring that public companies appoint women to
40–60% of corporate board seats by 2015.39 However, this law has been
described as “aspirational,” i.e., without severe penalty for noncompliance.40
31

Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 57

(2009).
32

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 64–65.
34
Id. at 67.
35
Valentina Pop, EU Parliament Backs Female Quotas for Top Corporate Jobs,
EUOBSERVER.COM (July 7, 2011, 9:25 AM), http://euobserver.com/18/32598.
36
Id.
37
Ilaria Cantu, Italy Introduces Women’s Quota, HENKEL DIVERSITY BLOG (May 3, 2011, 5:21
AM),
http://www.henkeldiversity.com/2011/05/03/italy-introduces-womens-quota-italien-fuhrt-frauen
quote-ein.html.
38
Douglas M. Branson, Women on Boards of Directors: A Global Snapshot 7 (U. of Pittsburgh Sch.
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-05, Feb. 2011).
39
Eric Westervelt, German Boardrooms Lack Women. Can Quotas Help?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 17, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/17/136276792/german-boardrooms-lack-women-canquotas-help.
40
Branson, supra note 38, at 6.
33
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In the United Kingdom, Lord Davies completed a report at the
behest of the Coalition Government to provide recommendations for
increasing female board membership in February 2011.41 Davies noted that
only 11% of the responses from stakeholders favored quotas and the vast
majority of women who responded were vehemently opposed to a quota
requirement.42 He went on to urge companies to promote women into these
positions, and added that there was potential for quotas to be legislated if
change was not achieved.43
Other European countries, while mandating the reporting of social
considerations in investment decisions,44 do not specifically require female
board representation as one of those social considerations. In 2011, the
Netherlands and Belgium considered legislating mandated percentages of
women on boards of directors, but instead approved non-binding quota
proposals.45 Portugal, with the fewest females on European corporate
boards,46 has not announced any pending legislation. Despite assertions to
the contrary,47 given that Germany, Sweden, Finland, and the UK oppose
quotas,48 it seems doubtful that the EU will spend its political capital on this
issue.
Since December 2010, Canada’s Senate has had a proposed bill
pending which would require that all public companies, financial institutions
and state-owned companies adopt a 50% quota to be attained within three
years of the passage of the law; however, there is currently insufficient
support for its enactment.49
The SEC issued a Proxy Disclosure Enhancement Rule, effective
February 28, 2010,50 amending Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K to require
that listed companies identify whether diversity is considered in board
nominations, with the conclusion that this would improve assessment of
board nominating decisions:

41
Brian Groom, Davies Review Seeks More Board Women, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/013e85fe-3cff-11e0-bbff-00144feabdc0.html.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Céline Louche & Steven Lydenberg, Socially Responsible Investment: Differences Between
Europe and United States, 14 (Vlerick Leuven Gent Mgmt. Sch., Working Paper Series No. 2006/22,
2006), available at http://www.vlerick.com/en/2472-VLK/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/
vlgms-wp-2006-22.pdf.
45
Kameliya Encheva, Belgium and the Netherlands Vote on Non-Binding Quotas, EUROPEAN
WOMEN’S LOBBY (June 3, 2011), http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?article1735&lang=en.
46
Id.
47
Pop, supra note 35.
48
Branson, supra note 38.
49
Pande & Ford, supra note 5, at 36.
50
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 239, 240, 249, and 274) (SEC adopting amendments to enhance information regarding proxy
solicitations).
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In the Proposing Release, we also requested comment on
whether we should amend our rules to require disclosure of
additional factors considered by a nominating committee
when selecting someone for a board position, such as board
diversity. A significant number of commenters responded
that disclosure about board diversity was important
information to investors. Many of these commenters
believed that requiring this disclosure would provide
investors with information on corporate culture and
governance practices that would enable investors to make
more informed voting and investment decisions.
Commenters also noted that there appears to be a
meaningful relationship between diverse boards and
improved corporate financial performance, and that diverse
boards can help companies more effectively recruit talent
and retain staff. We agree that it is useful for investors to
understand how the board considers and addresses diversity,
as well as the board’s assessment of the implementation of
its diversity policy, if any. Consequently, we are adopting
amendments to Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K to require
disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating
committee considers diversity in identifying nominees for
director. In addition, if the nominating committee (or the
board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of
diversity in identifying director nominees, disclosure would
be required of how this policy is implemented, as well as
how the nominating committee (or the board) assesses the
effectiveness of its policy.51
The foregoing reasoning would seem to call for the identification of
diversity factors that bear critically on corporate performance. However, the
SEC specifically declined to define diversity in the amendments:
We recognize that companies may define diversity in
various ways, reflecting different perspectives.
For
instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity
expansively to include differences of viewpoint,
professional experience, education, skill and other
individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board
heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts
such as race, gender and national origin. We believe that
for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies
should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they
51

Id. at 68,343–344.
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consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined
diversity in the amendments.52
“[I]n 1990 the UN Economic and Social Council set a target of 30%
female representation in decision-making bodies by 1995”;53 presumably,
this was a motivating factor for more than half of the world’s countries to
implement political gender quotas over the last twenty years.54 Since the
U.S. government has not been motivated to respond to this 1990 guidance
for the public sector, it seems unlikely that it will impose the requirement on
private entities in the future.
Some research suggests that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act55 will create
more opportunities for female board members:
By requiring a majority of independent directors, the
reforms encourage recruiters to look at a variety of new
sources for candidates, increasing the likelihood of women
landing seats. Because the majority of current board
members are currently men, recruiting from among them is
nearly useless because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes it
harder for members to juggle multiple board assignments.56
The authors support their case by pointing out that recruitment of women
directors increased since the Act’s inception, with searches for women
doubling for Catalyst (a non-profit organization with the mission of
expanding opportunities for women),57 in the sixteen months after the Act
was signed.58 Still, the doubled number only amounted to twenty searches.59
When one reviews the 2011 number of 12.3% board representation of
women in the U.S. across a very broad sample of public companies versus
the only slightly smaller number of 11.6% for the smaller group of Fortune
500 companies in 2001,60 it seems that Sarbanes-Oxley has not had a
significant impact to date.
C. Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR has been defined as “[a]ctions that appear to further some
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by
law.”61 This is the view of the majority of the business community62
52

Id. at 68,344.
Pande & Ford, supra note 5, at 8.
54
Id.
55
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
56
Bernardi et al., supra note 21, at 238 (citation omitted).
57
About Us, CATALYST, http://www.catalyst.org/page/59/about-us (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
58
Bernardi et al., supra note 21, at 238–39.
59
Id. at 239.
60
Branson, supra note 16, at 89.
61
MIKKO H. MANNER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRM
LEADERS 2 (2010) (citation omitted).
53
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although others have defined it more broadly to include all socially
beneficial initiatives as well as profitability.63 Still others suggest that
companies ought to choose as priorities only those CSR initiatives that
improve the company’s profitability, achieve strategic advantage, and have a
beneficial impact upon society and upon that particular business.64 This
view, which rewards companies for their efforts and encourages them to
undertake65 CSR efforts in which the company has a particular talent or
vested interest in performing (e.g., Toyota developing an engine with low
carbon emissions or a mining company with local labor in Africa working to
eradicate AIDS among its workers),66 seems more likely to result in
sustainable CSR efforts.
Prior to 2011, my duties for a multinational corporation included
providing the metrics required to satisfy institutional and other investors, as
well as advising the board of directors on performance, progress, and
recommended initiatives. While our working definition of CSR was
reporting and recommending socially beneficial actions taken by the
corporation, whether or not profitable, we did concentrate on those CSR
initiatives that were key to organizational and community reputation and
profitability.
The operating companies held by this parent corporation were
spread across the globe, were acquired at different times, and were very
entrepreneurial in terms of management. However, the common cultural
elements were financial and manufacturing expertise, compliance, and
safety. Building on those strengths with CSR initiatives that complemented
these areas made integration achievable, and safety initiatives in particular
fulfilled immediate benefits to our employees and to our profits, ensuring
not only workers’ compensation costs below those of industry norms, but
also that employees came home whole and healthy to their families and
communities.
Compliance helped avoid the costs associated with
governmental investigations and fines and aided the corporate reputation.
Manufacturing expertise increased profits while ensuring environmental
benefits to the community—efficient manufacturing practice avoided
sending excessive waste through the smokestack or waterways. Financial
expertise assured proper reporting and educational efforts throughout the
facilities, communicating the importance of financial goals, and mandates
yielded results in day-to-day operations.

62

Id.
Id. at 2–3.
64
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. R., Dec. 2006, at 80.
65
Id. at 89.
66
Id. at 9–10.
63
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Since these were already core to the corporate culture, the only
additional burden imposed by CSR was publication to the community of
those efforts. Gathering the data and providing reports, which fulfilled
requirements of the board, investors, and ratings agencies, was timeconsuming but rewarding. Everyone knew the impetus behind the effort and
the results were tangible, so those efforts were very sustainable.
Hence, rather than working toward female board representation in
leadership positions, CSR efforts were primarily directed towards projects
that advanced employee safety, or return to shareholders through improved
manufacturing or financial training. My admittedly unscientific theory is
that lower female representation for industrial companies results in part
from spending more time addressing those physical and safety needs at the
base of Maslow’s motivational pyramid67 than companies whose businesses
have fewer physical risks.
A great deal of managerial time and attention is expended upon the
review of process, equipment, product, and feedstock required to ensure safe
production is accomplished in a manufacturing facility. This concern is not
misplaced; the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports an incidence of
injuries nearly three times higher for manufacturing (4.3 cases per 100 fulltime workers) than for financial activities (1.5 cases for 100 full-time
workers),68 showing a higher degree of risk for industrial activities.
Non-manufacturing companies with fewer inherent safety
challenges may have more resources available to review board gender
composition, thereby attaining the higher levels of social, esteem, and selfactualization goals on the motivational pyramid.69 When one examines
women on boards by industrial sector, the 2011 percentage of companies
with at least three women directors ranged from below 4% for automotive,
chemical, and industrial goods and services to a high of approximately 17–
20% for banking, insurance, and media,70 giving some support to this
theory. A 2010 McKinsey & Company report reflects corroborating results,
with 16% of boards for consumer goods and retail including women, but
10% or less in infrastructure, real estate, transportation, energy, and
diversified industries.71

67

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Father of Modern Management & Leadership by Employee
Motivation, ABRAHAM MASLOW, http://www.abraham-maslow.com/m_motivation/Hierarchy_of_
Needs.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (stating that the five levels of motivational needs, from most basic
to highest aspirations, are as follows: physiological, safety, social, esteem, and self-actualization)
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Professor Douglas Branson has commented that in the U.S. there is
a bit of diversity fatigue, perhaps due to the economic challenges of 2007 to
2009.72 Weathering these economic storms was certainly the main priority
for my former employer, whose markets were housing and automotive,
sectors hit particularly hard in the downturn.
While the profit and legislation research discussed above do not
reveal worldwide adoption of gender-diverse boards, the increasing trend
toward CSR within this new century73 leads one to inquire whether gender
diversity on boards is a recognized item on the CSR agenda for public
companies. Generally, social and financial returns for corporations and
investors are important to socially responsible investors from both United
States and Europe.74 However, in my years of communications with the
investment community for a London-based company, I do not recall any
inquiry specifically seeking information about gender composition of
boards.
Nor do I recall such inquiries from rating agencies regarded as most
relevant to the company.75 The reason is perhaps best summed up by Julie
McDowell, Head of Socially Responsible Investment for Standard Life
Investments Limited, an investment management company that held a
significant position in my former employer’s stock when it was publicly
traded: “In my experience the composition of boards and the presence of
women on boards are not generally looked at as a CSR issue.”76
Ms. McDowell’s perspective, as a representative of a company that
provides clients with information to ensure successful investing choices, is
very illuminating. Board composition is not part of the CSR analysis.
While not a priority item for CSR ratings among institutional
investors, are there some industries that recognize board gender equity as a
CSR priority? Eurosif’s77 recent research provides an analysis of major
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) challenges among the many
72
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industry sectors78 comprising their organization do not focus on gender
board issues.79
The majority of reports reviewed emphasized other human rights
issues. In terms of priorities, however, elevating women from management
to executive suites does not seem to be advancing significantly as a result of
CSR initiatives. The Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Index, which screens
U.S. companies for social responsibility and publishes results to investors,
includes the number of women on boards as a measure of social
responsibility.80 Nonetheless, a September 2010 survey of about 1,500
business leaders worldwide across all industries yielded only a 28% positive
response as to whether gender diversity was a top-ten priority for their
company.81 The survey referenced women in all C-level positions (CEO,
COO, CFO, etc.), and not just board members, so it is likely that the boardlevel priority is not a focus in all 28% of the companies with an affirmative
response.
D. Cultural & Demographic Trends
The theory that gender imbalance on boards is because there are not
enough women in the pipeline has been rejected by some researchers.82
Even if that used to be so, the last two generations have substantially
increased the proportion of qualified female candidates. In addition, cultural
shifts reflecting women’s gains in education, ability and willingness to delay
childbearing, and the changing demands of the economy may converge to
encourage gender equality on boards.
The proportion of adult women working or looking for work in the
United States rose from 33% in 1950 to 61% in 1999,83 with the 61%
remaining steady during the first decade of this century; meanwhile, the
percentage of adult men represented in the labor force (at 75% in 2009) has
declined steadily since the 1950s.84 With nearly doubled participation over
the last sixty years, more presence in the workforce must surely lead to more
consideration for women, particularly when one considers that, as of 2009,
more women than men were in management, professional, and related
78
Sector Reports, EUROSIF, http://www.eurosif.org/research/sector-reports (last visited Sept. 15,
2011). Industries listed: infrastructure, extractives, insurance, automobiles, food production, hotels and
tourism, forestry and paper, chemical, real estate, nuclear, shipping, information and communication
technologies hardware, and banking. Id.
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See, e.g., O’Connor, supra note 4, at 471–73 (suggesting that male stereotyping and exclusion
from informal networks, rather than lack of experience, were barriers to senior leadership positions); Cf.
Women Matter, supra note 5, at 6 (finding that despite the growth of female university graduates the
number of women in corporate leadership will remain low over the next 30 years).
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occupations (51%).85
In 1970, 14% of U.S. men had college degrees, and only 8% of
women were college graduates.86 In 2009, the percentage of college
graduates among men and women was even, at about 28%.87 This fortyyear history of progress means more women have attained the education
level and years of experience suitable for board seats. The average age of
males on U.S., Australian, and Canadian boards ranges from fifty-six to
sixty-one, with the average age for females at fifty-three to fifty-six.88
In 2008, U.S. women actually surpassed men in college degrees
awarded.89 “For non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and for non-Hispanic
American Indian/Alaskan Native groups, more than 60% of bachelor’s and
master’s degrees were earned by women. For non-Hispanic Whites and
non-Hispanic Asians, more than 50% of bachelor’s and master’s degrees
were earned by women.”90 This does not appear to be an anomalous year;
more women than men at the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four have a
college degree, reversing the norm of forty years ago and before.91 Nor is
this trend of women overtaking men in education a U.S. phenomenon; in
lower-middle income countries, women versus men are at an 11:10 ratio in
tertiary education, with a ratio of 14:10 in upper-middle-income countries.92
Another source states that in fifteen out of seventeen of the wealthiest
countries, more women than men are graduating from college.93
For the U.S., as of 2009, the percentage of people aged twenty-five
to thirty-four with at least two years of graduate education stood at 11% for
women and 8% or below for men.94 In 2008, women comprised 59% of
graduate school enrollees.95 While women still earn fewer degrees than men
in science and technology, in 2008, they surpassed men in business and
management degrees.96
Interestingly, the occupations they chose appear to be more
recession-proof than men’s. Prior to the 1980s, men had a higher
unemployment rate; after that, the jobless rates for men and women were
about equal until the past four recessions (occurring between 1981 and
85
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2009), when the jobless rates for men rose to 9.9% when compared to 7.7%
for women.97 The Department of Commerce has opined that this is due to
men’s employment being more concentrated to “cyclically sensitive
occupations, such as manufacturing production and construction.”98
Without widespread profit, legislative, or CSR motivators, how did
the rise of women come to pass? By the 1990s, cultural institutions,
marketers, and even governments focused particularly on encouraging
young women to pursue independence and career success.99 In addition to
cultural factors, globalization, improved productivity, and digital technology
have moved the world economy from manufacturing and toward knowledge
and services, to women’s advantage.100 Beginning in the 1960s, a growing
number of jobs in the Western world required knowledge and ideas rather
than physical strength or manual dexterity; technology, law, design, and
finance careers have flourished.101 By the mid-1990s, knowledge workers
made up a third of the U.S. workforce.102 The very nature of the
employment available has given women more opportunities.
In 1970, women held less than 10% of the bachelor’s degrees in
business, but currently, women are in the majority in this discipline.103
There has also been a disproportionate increase in women earning degrees in
life science, physical sciences, and engineering.104
While at the top business schools men still predominate, trends
show an increase for women.105 Since 2005, there has been a 13% increase
in women’s enrollment in MBA programs, and more women than men are
starting businesses.106
In addition to jobs requiring less physicality and a culture
encouraging girls to compete, medical technology may play a factor. One
author suggests the widespread availability of the contraceptive pill
beginning in the 1960s made it rational to invest in education for a career
with a long training period.107 And, for every year a woman delays having
her first child, her lifetime earnings rise by 10%.108 At least two generations
of women have had the opportunity to observe the success of their sisters
who delayed motherhood and therefore prospered.
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Provocatively, the question has been asked: “So if women are so
great, why aren’t they running the place?”109 The answer, according to at
least one author, is that:
Many experts believe that time is coming, not so much
because in the future everyone will be gender-blind, but
because the knowledge economy workplace requires a more
feminine style of leadership. Modern management theorists
look down on the hierarchical arrangements and
competitive individualism of yesterday’s office. Instead
they advise executives to promote a sense of community
and teamwork.110
The emergence of well-educated and experienced women is
juxtaposed with an upcoming talent shortfall projected in Europe by 2040,
when a dearth of twenty-four million skilled workers is forecast.111 The
United States and Japan are also facing flattening birth rates;112 hence,
employers and planners are already strategizing for optimization of the
skilled workforce. The aging of the workforce in developed countries
combined with the rise of rapidly developing economies driving up demand
for skilled professionals113 will, by necessity, increase women’s access to
the boardroom.
Inevitably, businesses compete for scarce commodities.
If
employees have their choices of where to work, then they may logically be
expected to consider a firm’s reputation for providing a quality environment
for both men and women. When one reviews Fortune magazine’s “100 Best
Companies to Work For” list, analysis of twenty-seven firms appearing on
the list and within the Fortune 500 shows a positive correlation between the
number of female directors and the company’s appearance on the list.114 Of
the 100 selected for inclusion in the list, 25% of the employee comments
noted family-oriented benefits such as flexible scheduling, daycare subsidies
and adoption assistance.115
If companies perceive a benefit to retaining top female talent, they
are likely to implement strategic measures to do so.116 Not surprisingly,
those family-oriented benefits lauded by employees working at companies
identified by Fortune as quality workplaces, are among the thirteen gender109
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diversity measures identified by executives surveyed by McKinsey and
Company as key to their strategy of gender diversity.117
III. CONCLUSION
The business case for adding women to boards will most likely
never emerge as a compelling argument for those unwilling to look at
intangibles which cannot be measured directly. Legislative efforts do not
currently have the momentum required to create worldwide impacts in the
next decade, or to be widely adopted in countries that have not already
mandated them.
CSR initiatives for corporations are generally chosen to advance, at
least indirectly, the profitable or cultural biases and priorities of the
organization. Therefore, voluntary adoption of more gender-diverse boards
is unlikely until circumstances make it beneficial. Institutional investors and
rating agencies have not acted as effective catalysts to make this a priority.
Their focus tends to be more on the corporation’s impact to the community
as a whole.
The historically slow pace of female representations on boards is,
however, likely to quicken. Advanced education has greatly increased the
number of women with the ability to take on business and management
positions. The changing marketplace, with more jobs requiring expertise in
communications and technical knowledge, rather than physical strength,
plays into the strengths and skills possessed by educated women. As more
women view the financial success of their mentors who have delayed
childbearing and advanced in their careers and compensation, they are
117
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13 gender-diversity measures identified by McKinsey & Company:
•
Options for flexible working conditions (e.g., part-time programs) and
or locations (e.g., telecommuting)
•
Visible monitoring by the CEO and executive team of progress in
gender-diversity programs
•
Programs to encourage female networking and role models
•
Support programs and facilities to help reconcile work and family life
(e.g., childcare, spouse relocation)
•
Encouragement or mandates for senior executives to mentor junior
women
•
Inclusion of gender-diversity indicators in executives’ performance
reviews
•
Skill-building programs aimed specifically at women
•
Performance evaluation systems that neutralize the impact of parental
leaves or flexible work arrangements
•
Indicators of the company’s performance in hiring, retaining,
promotion and developing women
•
Gender-specific hiring goals and programs
•
Programs to smooth transitions before, during, and after parental leaves
•
Systematic requirement that at least one female candidate be in each
promotion pool
•
Gender quotas in hiring, retaining, promoting, or developing women
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motivated to structure their lives to achieve career success.
All of the readiness, capability, and motivation described above will
be in place at the time there is a talent shortfall in industrialized nations due
to flattening birth rates, providing incentive to corporations to abandon
lingering bias for competitive advantage. Those factors creating a quality
work environment allow the flexibility in working conditions that will
permit women to fulfill their biological destiny of raising families without
sacrificing their intellectual and earnings potential. The glass ceiling will
soon be replaced by a glass slipper, and Cinderella will take her rightful
place beside the prince in governance of the realm.
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